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Intelligence in Transition





In Macedonia, intelligence gathering dates back more than 100 years.
However, the modern structure and system was for almost half a century,
was directed by Yugoslavia during the last fifty years. The Macedonian
Intelligence Agency was officially established in 1995. Its status and func-
tion were defined by law, but there were obstructions and attempts at revi-
sion; that is, the restoration of the previous model. This caused a three-
year delay in the transformation and establishment of modern
Macedonian modern.  Conditions have gradually changed since 1998,
and the Intelligence Agency has begun to operate as a separate state
institution for foreign intelligence. Preparing a case study of the develop-
ment of intelligence in a post-communist state faces the challenge of rep-
resenting conditions comprehensively and objectively. This challenge can-
not be met fully, for the time period under analysis is still in transition, the
data incomplete and fluid.  Hence, the time of the adjustment of the
secret services to the conditions and circumstances will differ. 
Introduction or Basic Dilemmas
Preparing a case study of the development of intelligence in a
post-communist state faces the challenge of representing condi-
tions comprehensively and objectively. This challenge cannot be
met fully, for the time period under analysis is still in transition, the
data incomplete and fluid.  Hence, the time of the adjustment of
the secret services to the conditions and circumstances will differ. 
The decade following the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end
of the Cold War acutely demonstrated the turbulence, shocks, and
controversies within and around the intelligence services of former
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communist systems.  In fact, it is an impressive indicator of the
“child diseases” that intelligence contracted in the transition from
a totalitarian to a democratic system. The problems and dilemmas
arise, basically, from two tendencies.  The first and radical one, is
total nihilism and anathema towards all former structures, fol-
lowed by an effort to disband them using “revolutionary” methods
and then forming completely new ones. The second tendency is a
counter reaction to the first principle; that is, some things should
probably be changed, but in the way that allows things to remain
as before. However, it was immediately apparent that both
approaches were in deep collision with the stated goal of bring-
ing intelligence into conformity with the Euro-Atlantic orientation.
Thus, the decade transition of intelligence services was a crit-
ical time of profiling and adjustment, which in some post-com-
munist countries is still in process. Proof of that are the recurring
reports of diverse intelligence activities, affairs, and scandals.
Because of the above, analytical “vivisection” of intelligence in
transition, is analogous to an orthodox believer facing this dilem-
ma: If he tells the absolute truth, he will be right before God, but
he will make superior angry. If he beautifies the unpleasant truth,
he will satisfy the vanity of his superior, but he will conceal the truth
before God.
Hence, obtaining a comprehensive and objective “tell-all” of
intelligence is to be hoped for, but probably would prove a
mirage. Simply put, today’s facts and truths are tomorrow’s fic-
tions and biases. Because of recidivism of prejudice and negative
fixations from the former system, intelligence services find it diffi-
cult to break with the past. The abandoning of the old without a
new set of values or clear rules in place leaves the role and func-
tion of intelligence activity in transition countries either adrift or in
limbo.
History of Intelligence in Macedonia
Intelligence in Macedonia historically has deep roots.
Although the intelligence service was formed formally and offi-
cially in 1995, its existence actually dates back more than 100
years. In 1896, the Central Committee Congress of the Secret
Macedonian-Odrin Revolutionary Organization formed a secret
police unit to observe the  “internal and external enemy.” The
intelligence service was under the jurisdiction of the “investigative
division” which conducted surveillance, collection of evidence,
and detection of enemies. But this was the romantic,  idealistic
part of the revolutionary fight of the Macedonian people at the
close of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. Modern intel-
ligence in Macedonia is organically connected with the previous
Yugoslav security-intelligence system. Specifically, during the

























network and infiltrating the most sensitive areas of the occupying
forces, all within the framework of the united Yugoslav national-
liberation authority.
The modern structure and function of Macedonian intelli-
gence (for almost half a century) was determined and directed
both by the State Security Service in the Federal Secretariat for
Internal Affairs and by  the corresponding federal intelligence
services of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs. However,
the ideological component was the main pillar of this powerful
communist security-intelligence structure. 
The monopoly for a united system of internal and foreign
intelligence was founded on broad, repressive police powers with
the added flavor of classical political police. The spheres of com-
petence and powers was broad and diverse, but still the main task
was to collect data and prevent individuals, groups, and organi-
zations from undermining or destroying the constitutional socialist
self-management order. Thus, the main thrust of foreign intelli-
gence was focused on “external enemies”, with a special empha-
sis on “adversary emigration.” 
All intelligence services from former Yugoslav Republics oper-
ated as an integral component of the Federal State Security
Service. There was no authentic, independent intelligence service;
it was part of the security system which had long had the power,
authority, and prestige, and thus had established itself as the dom-
inant security pillar in the former united federal state.
Security and Intelligence System in Republic of Macedonia
The modern history of the autochthonous Macedonian intelli-
gence is an integral part of the short history of independent and
sovereign Macedonia. With the implosion of the former, structur-
al changes in the former one-party totalitarian security-intelli-
gence sphere were mandated. The first was to differentiate
between intelligence and counterintelligence; that is, to set up
spheres of competence, and to induce cooperation between civil
and military services. This first step guaranteed that there would be
no arbitrary or vague interpretations of the jurisdictions of the civil
and military services in the conduct of domestic and foreign intel-
ligence.
The lack of understanding between the two services and their
reluctance to merge overlapping functions prolonged the reforms
of Macedonia’s security and intelligence system. Five years later,
following the declaration of independence and autonomy of our
state, a Law established the Intelligence Agency as the sole and
special body of state administration for conducting foreign intelli-
gence. The Law was a logical epilogue to the reorganization of
the Interior Ministry. The State Security Service was divided into the
























the Ministry; the Intelligence Agency was designated a special
state institution. The status thus defined differentiated between
counterintelligence and foreign intelligence and set out their
spheres of competence.
Unfortunately, the Security and Counterintelligence
Directorate (to which the Defense Ministry Counterintelligence
and Intelligence Sector belonged) continued to raise objeactins
and obstructions even after the status and functions of the
Intelligence Agency had been legally defined. The players of this
often public dispute argued to continue the status quo, each pro-
tecting its old positions and concerns. One, that “the Defense
Ministry had no intention of leaving military strategic intelligence
to the Intelligence Agency”; the other, that “the Intelligence
Agency should be placed under the Interior Ministry and should
operate as an organizational unit within the Security and
Counterintelligence Directorate.” These arguments and accom-
panying actions were unsuccessful; they were transparent attempts
to restore the organization of the security and intelligence struc-
tures which had been part of the former system.
The doubtful reasoning and spurious effort in support of the
status quo (i.e., for “cementing” the former State Security Service)
was a paradigm of the “mental code” of the Security and
Counterintelligence Directorate; they simply did not want (or
failed to understand) that internal and foreign intelligence are dif-
ferent entities and thus must not be confused. They were con-
vinced that both components (counterintelligence and intelli-
gence) could operate jointly. 
The Security and Intelligence Sector at the Defense Ministry
also ignored the fact that intelligence gathering today is an exclu-
sively civil function, relatively detached from the executive power,
especially from the police and military structures. In fact, the cur-
rent Defense Law only determines internal security in defense. The
military units collect data and information via operational and tac-
tical reconnaissance conducted in the unit’s zone of responsibility
and through military attaches. 
The reasons for this division of tasks between strategic and
tactical military intelligence are to avoid duplicating or overlap-
ping the agents’ networks and to avoid or eliminate unnecessary
expenditures, tasks and activities. Also, military-defense structures
are usually regarded as a narrow framework for conducting
strategic intelligence, which has a higher significance for a state.
Towards Modeling of a Modern Intelligence Service
However, unlike democratic states which are pragmatic and
rational when modeling stable, efficient intelligence services, post-
communist countries (many still “fluid”) have to overcome the left-


























influence, political narrow-mindedness, and revenge. Following
the old model of an intelligence service generates instability and
criminalization in the countries in transition. 
The practical experience of the German BND after World War
II illustrates the importance of intelligence when national interests
are concerned. Germany’s top priority was to safeguard the state
and its national interests. Because of his expansive professional
experience (which was crucial to preserving, developing, and
maintaining tradition), former Nazi General Reinhard Gehlen was
given the job of forming a new German intelligence service.  The
main objective of the German nation was to suppress political
foment and political paranoia, which unavoidably lead to loss of
confidence, increased opposition, destruction of the service, and,
eventually, loss of  illusions and the desire to create democratic
institutions. 
However, this view of a modern intelligence service was not
favored by other countries in transition, including the Republic of
Macedonia. Fortunately, the attempts to restore the old, worn-out
model were unsuccessful. However, the young, undeveloped
democracy of the Republic of Macedonia still faces latent, chron-
ic temptations and challenges to the establishment of an efficient,
professional, and expert intelligence model.
Vestiges of these misunderstandings affected the Intelligence
Agency’s ability to function and carry on its work. Because of the
lack of office space, materials, financial aid, and manpower, two
years passed at “idle speed.” The Intelligence Agency only began
to function in the second half of 1997. The working staff consist-
ed of employees from the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of
Defense. However, it was immediately apparent that among them
were those no or negative professional references, poor work
records, and ones who were (deliberately) put on the “transfer
list”.  Problems soon surfaced in adapting these personnel to the
new intelligence service. They found it difficult to abandon
ingrained police standards, rules of work, and behavior, and to
adopt a different methodological approach regarding operational
and analytical intelligence work.
For post-communist countries in transition, paramount was
the necessity to depoliticize or, better, remove the party influence
on security services. In principle, this view was ideal; however, in
reality its implementation was impossible; for such an undertaking
in a period of transition is a long-term process, its results uncer-
tain. 
Party influence in the old system dominated all spheres; any-
thing could be politicized; debates were endless. Intelligence serv-
ices were not exempt, being the “driving force of the only party.”
However, the imperative to change the system demanded quick

























the professional rules regulating every day operational and
analytical work. But events proved that these rules were not only
ambiguous, unclear, and confusing, but also contradictory. 
In countries in transition, negating party influence and de-
professionalizing the security and intelligence services remain a
priority; however, recidivism of the one-party system is a survival
technique of the ruling party. Instead of recruiting public offi-
cials who will work in the interest of the state, regardless of the
political party in power, untrained personnel are recruited who
are sympathetic to and promote the development schemes of
the ruling party. However, in practice, party soldiers sooner or
later become the gravediggers of the party and the national
interest as well. For it is absurd and tragic when marginal, inex-
perienced figures, who also lack professional credence,
become modus vivendi and creators of intelligence. 
The past decade of transition showed that party soldiers are
used to support and solidify the power structure.  However, at
the same time, the “power” was not only ungrateful but quick
to sacrifice its soldiers, all with the end of remaining in power.
This attitude corroborates the conclusion of Zbigniew Brzezinski
that the “journey” away from communism will probably last for
as long as its “stay” in it. So the period of transition for post-
communist countries (optimistically forecast to end in ten years)
proved an illusion. It is now clear that it will be indefinitely
longer. 
Some problems in implementing reform programs were
caused by the lack of full cooperation between the President of
the Republic and the Government. Because of different political
options, the cooperation between the two holders of the exec-
utive power (the President, who was from the ranks of the for-
mer government, and the new Government, formed after the
parliamentary elections in 1998) was fragmentary at best.  Thus
the unbalanced competence in the sphere of intelligence
between the Government and the President of the Republic had
a negative influence on the functioning and establishment of
the Agency; namely, pursuant to the law, the Government has
the authority to authorize and adopt the acts for the organiza-
tion of the work and systematization of jobs, and to determine
the means and methods of work; it also determines the budget
for the Intelligence Agency. The President of the Republic has
the authority only to appoint and/or discharge the Director of
the Agency. Thus, although the law provides that the Director
answers to the Government, in practice that liability was not
always operable. As a result, following the resignation of the
Director in 1999, the President unilaterally appointed an acting
Director of the Intelligence Agency, who was discharged a year

























Since a Law on the System of National Security has not as yet
been passed, there is no precise demarcation of the spheres of
competence of the segments of the security and intelligence sys-
tem. Instead, the bases for the organization, operation, and
spheres of competence and cooperation are regulated by special
laws relating to the services and fields for home and foreign
affairs, defense, and intelligence. Thus, for instance, in the current
Law on the Intelligence Agency, this obligation is regulated by a
general provision which is not applicable to other security struc-
tures. The absence of a legal regulation for the national security
system is relevant, for it has been demonstrated that in regular or
emergency situations, special laws cannot standardize forms and
obligations for mutual communication and exchange of informa-
tion. 
Causally connected with the above is the presence of a body
with executive power to coordinate the tasks and activities of the
security-intelligence structures. This would enhance forecasting,
which is invaluable if the political leadership is to make suitable
decisions.
However, the negative experiences regarding the status and
functions of intelligence are now old news. It is a fact that condi-
tions are changing significantly in all respects. The objective
obstacles of space, material, and work conditions have been
removed. A basic organizational structure now overlooks the
selection of staff and the establishment of partnerships relations
with a number of foreign intelligence services. Its result is a small,
but modern, efficient, and professional intelligence service.  In
fact, the organization, development, and function of intelligence
services in transition countries is a continuing process, requiring
constant review.
The turbulence and ferment that racked intelligence services
in former communist countries produced a crisis of identity. This
was reflected in an erosion of the established service, caused by
the vacuum created after the break with the former ideology, and
the difficulty of implementing a new system of values. These con-
cerns impeded the efforts for fast and efficient reform of post-com-
munist intelligence services.
In this interregnum, the media’s role is to report accurately
and thoroughly affairs, scandals, and piquances connected with
intelligence activity. Their obligation to report the facts that they
uncover is a given. In most cases, however, the media do not stop
with just printing the facts.  They may start with them, but they
immediately go on to make inferences and judgments based on
them; the result is an opinion piece expressing the biases and pol-
itics of the newspaper’s publisher. 
This style, deliberate or not, often leaks security-intelligence
























the confused atmosphere during the transition, but more probably
from political manipulation.  There are two explanations. On one
hand, the former, highly bureaucratized intelligence structures
erected a “bronze gate” to shield their activities.  On the other, the
democratic public and media favored and fostered maximum
transparency. The first tendency is rigid and seclusive.  The latter
is extremely liberal and open.  The latter approach, however,
overlooks the fact that absolute transparency is counterproduc-
tive; in addition, it questions the possibility and even the need for
intelligence services.
Politicians who mistrust intelligence officers discreetly continue
to make them instruments of everyday political and - sometimes
narrower - party objectives. Intelligence officers, in turn, “read”
the politicians’ minds and then provide “adapted” knowledge that
satisfies their wishes and expectations. This symbiosis is the prod-
uct of the vanity and frustration of the new “democratic,” transi-
tional politicians, and the moral and mental gymnastics of the
intelligence officers.
Black and White Views
Another important issue is whether officials from the former
State Security Service should remain in the new intelligence struc-
tures. This question was posed by the political paranoia that arose
after the destruction of the communist system. Two attitudinal
responses (black and white) emerged.  One was that the secret
services generally represented the classical mafia organization,
based on violence and total citizen control. In truth, these accu-
sations can be somewhat substantiated. However, to the mafia’s
benefit, its main function was to protect national interests from
external threats and negative influences. 
The second response merges with the first; it then proceeds
from the prejudice that in post-communist intelligence structures
(after ten years of transition), conservative, like-minded persons,
and desperadoes who oppose reforms are one of the factors gen-
erating  organized crime. Time has shown both the black and
white view are an unconvincing alibi meant to mask the incapa-
bility of the new authorities in post-communist countries.
After the break with the old ideology, post-communist coun-
tries began letting go their personnel who were the most loyal and
professional and who had survived the security barricades.
However, post-communist countries soon realized that greater
damage was caused by the dissatisfied and rejected intelligence
officers released from their ranks than by their opponents.
Because of this, and to avoid compromising and depleting the
services, “consolidation” rejected the philosophy of a two-sided,


























ligence activities would afford equal treatment of both potential
enemies, allies, and partners.
One reason for this change in attitude was the unprecedent-
ed harassment of former intelligence officers after the fall of the
Berlin Wall. Some officers, to make a living, established contacts
with representatives of foreign intelligence structures and released
concrete intelligence data, names of agents, networks, etc. Some
of the dismissed turned to private enterpreneurship and estab-
lished consulting offices, detective and security agencies, and
became consultants in the media and other legal businesses, in
which their professionalism and expertise were welcomed.  They
knew the proceses for quckly gathering and organizing data, and
possessed the analytical skills needed to evaluate and forecast.
A third group was involved in organized crime; they affiliated
with mafia structures and had the status of so-called “outside
associates”; or they entered a close circle of politicians and
became their instruments. 
These ex-officers had the expansive knowledge, experience,
and connections, but they were not in a positoin to exploit it.  In
some terrorist actions, in addition to the terrorists, the mafia
recruited former intelligence officers; they became “hit men,” pro-
fessional executors, murderers for hire.
Thus was created a shadow intelligence structure, a parallel
form of influence in politics and the economy. A new, powerful
network of business advisors was created from the ranks of former
intelligence officers. But only the “firm” was changed – from the
Government to their own firm, an established company, or a crim-
inal organization.
Initiative for Balkan Intelligence Conference
The many obstacles faced by the post-Communist intelligence
services leave the false impression that their aims were amiguous
and their competence suspect.   But if one considers the fact that
their security-intelligence segments have always been slow to alter
or change old habits and adjust to new forms of technology.
Historical examples are illustrative enough; and transition is just
the latest proof for this conclusion.
One asks the question now: what are the future expectations?
The most serious question faced is how to complete the transfor-
mation? The answer will probably come from the collective think-
ing and imagination of those deciding the function and role of
intelligence in the new democratic and legal milieu. In this con-
text, intelligence in the Republic of Macedonia functions as part of
the Balkan and European market of information. The initiative
now is to establish a Balkan Intelligence Conference as a forum

























countries. Members would exchange intelligence information and
views and cooperate bi- and multi-laterally. 
Finally, one must concede that intelligence in transition
involves slow, carefully planned and monitored change to achieve
the “new reality.” I am convinced that intelligence and political
astuteness  will prevail.
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